H 381 Modern Japan:

Party Politics in Imperial Japan

 

Era of Conflict: Parties v. Oligarchy

Parties opposed "clique" government

Yamagata's approach was to just dissolve the Diet, call an election and use muscle

But this approach could not be sustained. so...

Itô forms own party, the Seiyukai 1900

Parties begin to build their electoral base v. "politics of protest"

e.g., Hara Kei recruited to head and build up the party

--he recruited "up and coming bureaucrats" and solidified Seiyukai party strength;

--he was a non-Sat-Chô political party leader and dubbed first "commoner" Prime Minister when he took office in 1918;

But Walker reminds us in the Ashio Mine story that Hara was named Minister of Home Affairs in 1907 and presided over the police moving in and dismanthling the entire village of Yanaka over and against the people's objections. (See Walker PDF, pp. 105-06)

 

Saionji-Katsura Era of Compromisen1905-1912

Prime Minister's office could be handed back and forth between Seiyukai Cabinet and a Yamagata protoge without needing to rely on the Genrô. the so-called "Elder Statesmen," Sat-Cho leaders. So the late Meiji years showed that despite all the limitations of the Meiji Constitution, it was possible for political parties to operate in the miniscule space alloted to them by the system. But there were serious ambiguities and unresolved issues that remained. As historian SCM Paine notes, Democracy requires a combination of

--broad electoral participation,

--fair elections, and

--voter control over political office. 

Electoral participation did grow...but the political parties did not develop as mass organizations.  (More on this later.)

Rather, they represented rural elites who controlled voting patterns in their areas, then leveraged the power of the lower house to veto the budget and tax increases in order to strike compromises with other elites.

Also, there were key institutions not subject to electoral control including

--the Upper House, or House of Peers,

--the Privy Council,

--the military, and their General Staffs,

--the oligarchs themselves,

--and the emperor himself (89-90)

Some historians have felt that a good way to look at this is to see "Plural Elites" at work competing with one another without clear lines of demarcation in place. What was once thought of as a "Beast with Many Heads" (i.e., the Oligarchy, the small group of government leaders dating from the days of the Restoration) was now being seen as a "Head with Many Bodies" (i.e., the figurehead of the emperor on top with civilian leaders in the Diet, the political parties, both the civilian and military bureaucracy, the heads of the military services, the chiefs of staff, the Cabinet ministers, all the staff in the Imperial Household Ministriy, the Chamberlain, the Privy Council, etc., etc. A lot of bodies!!

Paine goes on:

While the oligarchs lived, the system was quite cozy. Four palace leaders

--the imperial household minister,

--the grand chamberlain,

--the chief aide de camp, and

--the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal,who,

-- along with leaders of the executive branch,

--leaders of the armed forces, and

--those who formerly held these positions,

together negotiated the consensus.

The Constitution was brief and unspoken about many things which the Genrô (The Senior or 'Elder' Statesmen) leveraged to their advantage with personal ties, loyalties, etc.. These kinds of informal exercises of power were very key.  But succession and transfer of power always remained an issue. 

The War and Navy Ministers, and the Chiefs of Staff, had direct access to the Emperor. Beginning in 1900 it was required that both Army and Navy Ministers be on active duty which gave Yamagata control overthe appointment of the War Minister.  Army and Navy Chiefs of Staff could then bypass Prime Minister by issuing imperial orders in the name of the emperor. In effect, they could paralyze or bring down a cabinet!

After Yamagata's death, the War Minister and the Chief of General Staff became potential political rivals. 

The Meiji Constitution, then, lacked an institutional mechanism to force civil and military leaders to consider integration of all instruments of national power like finance, production, commerce, and diplomacy.  With the passing of the Oligarchs, though, the War and Army-Navy ministers and Chiefs of staff could act without accountability.  In time, this meant that the military could limit civil interference in military affairs but no one limited military interference in civil affairs. Eventually, civilian authority was overwhelmed by the military. Sad Story.

 

Taisho Political Crisis of 1912-13

Katsura forms his own party, the Doshikai 1913

which evolves into Kenseikai

headed by Kato Komei

later called the Minseito

 

Rice Riots 1918----------> Hara becomes Premier = the first so-called "Commoner Prime Minister"

Ushers in the Era of

"Normal Course of Constitutional Government"

as two political parties,

the Seiyukai and the Kenseikai alternate/share power

 

BUT, Hara assassinated in 1921 leading to ------->

3 "Transcendental Cabinets" (i.e., non-party)

Then the GREAT KANTO EARTHQUAKE struck SEPT. 1, 1923

 

In the 1920s

The Seiyukai was in Power1927-29

The Kenseikai in Power 1925-26

The brought about passage in

1925 of the Universal Manhood Suffrage Bill

Long awaited, but along with it came the

Peace Preservation Law

The high level of consensus and the close working relationship among the Oligarchs that operated up through 1914-15, was pretty much gone as the oligarchs died off and competition became more intense among the various players, the "plural elites." 

Those who were most concerned with civilian rule lost control over the judiciary, the police, and the bureaucracy in general.  (85-88) But, interesting comment:

In 1920s, Finance Minister Takahashi Korekiyo wrote in a Memo to PM Hara:

The army does not stop at planning and sending troops abroad for military reasons, but interferes in diplomatic and economic decision-making as well, so that our country does not have a unified policy...Because the army's general staff interferes with other state organs, we should abolish it and unify the army's administration under the war ministry.  We should abolish both general staffs at the same time. (94)

Great idea...but it never happened!!

 

 

 

 

 

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